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RACE AS/AND THE TRACE OF THE GHOST: JURISPRUDENTIAL ESCAPISM, 
HORIZONTAL ANXIETY AND THE RIGHT TO BE RACIST IN BOE TRUST 
LIMITED 
 
JM Modiri 
 
The judge's political and moral values therefore play a routine, normal, and 
ineradicable role in adjudication. Accordingly, examination of the judge's 
underlying political and moral convictions and preconceptions is an 
appropriate line of legal commentary and criticism.1 
 
Race is absent precisely because it is so troubling. We prefer not to speak 
about it. We prefer not to think about it. We hardly have a language to 
express ourselves properly … It remains a spectre that haunts us …2 
 
1 Introduction 
 
In this note, a theoretical analysis and critique of the recent Supreme Court of 
Appeal (SCA) judgment of Erasmus AJA in BoE Trust Limited3 is presented. In it I 
offer two parallel but necessarily intersecting criticisms of the court's decision - one 
being a critique of its 'legal politics' (its underlying jurisprudential approach) and the 
other being a critique of its 'race politics' (its background racial ideology). I shall also 
examine the convergence between them, enquiring if there is, at least in this case, a 
"correlation between judicial style and interpretive method, on the one hand, and 
political ideology on the other";4 that is, if certain techniques of legal adjudication, in 
this case formalism, provide a better fit for the articulation and concealment of 
certain political and moral positions - in this case, a racially conservative one. 
 
The object and focus of the critique in this note is not so much the outcome of the 
judgment as it is the reasoning followed. Three specific features of the hidden 
politics of the judgment will be exposed and highlighted as problematic: (1) the 
                                                 
  Joel M Modiri. Researcher and Tutor, Department of Jurisprudence, Faculty of Law, University of 
Pretoria. E-mail: joelmodiri@gmail.com.  
1  Klare 1998 SAJHR 163. See also Klare and Davis 2010 SAJHR 403. 
2  Durrheim, Mtose and Brown Race Trouble 56. 
3  BoE Trust Limited 2013 3 SA 236 (SCA). 
4  Klare 1998 SAJHR 170. 
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rhetorical moves and 'legal interpretive techniques' by which the judge escaped the 
basic legal texts governing the situation in which a racially discriminatory provision is 
included in a will, as well as the substantive reasoning and normative choices that 
those texts necessarily invite; (2) how the escape from those legal texts evinces an 
anxiety towards the horizontal application of the Bill of Rights, which explicitly 
proscribes overt (racial) discrimination by private non-state actors and (3) how by 
following a formalist legal approach, one in which the basic assumptions of liberal 
legalism and capitalism are viewed as natural, normal and immutable, the judgment 
lacks a decisive rejection of racism. In short, I will suggest that the judgment not 
only lacks a substantive, transformative and democratic-minded method of legal 
reasoning, but also that it takes place uncritically from a colour-blind and post-racial 
standpoint and in the end, tolerates and protects whites' perceived right to be racist.  
 
The arguments in this note will proceed as follows. In the next part (part II), the 
facts of the case as well as the history of the case in the High Court will be briefly 
set out as a background to a discussion of the judgment. Thereafter (in part III), I 
will begin first by offering a jurisprudential critique of the judgment, specifically 
focusing on the formalist and liberal legalist assumptions that undergird the 
judgment as well as its evasion of the politics of interpretation and the horizontal 
application of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the 
Constitution). Secondly, I will develop a racial critique of the judgment, taking issue 
firstly with the extent to which a colour-blind and post-racial standpoint frames the 
judge's approach to the racial controversy at the heart of this case and secondly, 
with the depoliticising, privatising and unwittingly racist effects generated by such a 
standpoint. In conclusion (part IV), some thoughts on the implications of this case 
for post-apartheid jurisprudence and for the place of race - and critical approaches 
to race - in legal and social discourse in South Africa are offered.  
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2 Facts, history and judgment 
 
2.1 Facts 
 
This case dealt with an appeal against the judgment of Mitchell AJ in the Western 
Cape High Court in which he dismissed an application to have the word "White" - 
which was used to identify the group entitled to benefit - severed from a trust 
provision in a will. The last will and testament of Ms Daphne De Villiers contained a 
provision establishing the creation of the "Jean Pierre De Villiers Trust" in which the 
residue of her estate would be held. Among other things, the provision empowered 
the trustees to apply the part of the trust's income:5 
 
... for the provision of small bursaries to assist White South African students 
who have completed an MSc degree in Organic Chemistry at a South African 
University and are planning to complete their studies with a doctorate 
degree at a University in Europe or in Britain.  
 
The universities tasked with determining the selection of these students, and the 
size and duration of the bursaries included the (historically white) universities of 
Cape Town, Stellenbosch, Free State and Pretoria. In the will, the testatrix however 
adds the proviso that "[i]n the event that it should become impossible for [her] 
trustee[s] to carry out the terms of the trust, [she directs] that the income 
generated by the trust be used annually to provide donations equal in size" to a 
number of listed charitable organisations.6 This proviso was specifically added only 
after the testatrix was warned by family members that the trust objective limiting 
beneficiaries of the bursaries to white students would possibly not be given effect on 
account of its discriminatory nature.  
 
When the legal representatives of the trustees contacted the universities to confirm 
whether they would accept the bursary bequest on the conditions stipulated by the 
testatrix, the universities rejected it on the grounds of its racially exclusive nature. 
                                                 
5  BoE Trust Limited 2013 3 SA 236 (SCA) para 3. Original emphasis. 
6  BoE Trust Limited 2013 3 SA 236 (SCA) para 3. 
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Each indicated that should the "whites-only" condition be removed, they would 
gladly participate. 
 
Given this response, the trustees applied to the High Court for a rule nisi inviting 
interested parties to show why the word "White" should not be deleted from the will. 
The rule nisi was granted and after receiving no opposition, a final order was sought 
in the High Court. The trustees applied for the deletion of the racially exclusionary 
condition on the grounds that it was contrary to public policy, the constitutional right 
to equality,7 the provisions of section 7 of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention 
of Unfair Discrimination Act (the Equality Act),8 the principles contemplated in 
sections 3 and 4(a)(i) of the National Education Policy Act9 and the principles set out 
in the case of Minister of Education v Syfrets Trust,10 where considerations of 
equality were said to trump freedom of testation. The view of the trustees was that 
it would be more "prudent and preferable" if the word "white" were deleted, such 
that it would be acceptable to the universities and the bursaries could still be 
provided. However, Mitchell AJ dismissed the application, basing his decision mostly 
on the common law principle of freedom of testation and its relation to the 
constitutional right to property, which includes the right to dispose of one's property 
as one wishes.  
 
2.2 Supreme Court of Appeal judgment 
 
The main legal issue in the SCA was whether or not to uphold the appeal against 
Mitchell AJ's judgment and to allow a deletion of the word "white" from Ms de 
Villiers' last will and testament. Since the appellants had based their appeal on the 
similar SCA case of Curators, Emma Smith Educational Fund v University of Kwazulu-
Natal (Emma Smith)11 the legal issues before Erasmus AJA had to be considered in 
                                                 
7  Section 9 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
8  Section 7 of the Promotion of Equality and Prohibition of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000. 
9  National Education Policy Act 27 of 1996. 
10  Minister of Education v Syfrets Trust 2006 4 SA 205 (C). 
11  Curators, Emma Smith Educational Fund v University of Kwazulu-Natal 2010 6 SA 518 (SCA). 
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the light of the principles established in Emma Smith. It was thus of importance also 
to establish if Emma Smith could be distinguished from the case at hand.12  
 
Emma Smith had not been decided by the time the application was brought and 
when the High Court judgment by Mitchell AJ was issued. It dealt with the provisions 
of a will creating a charitable trust known as the "Emma Smith Educational Fund", 
the benefits of which were reserved solely for "[poor] European girls born of British 
South African or Dutch South African parents" who required financial assistance in 
order to pursue a tertiary education. In Emma Smith, Bertelsman AJA, upheld the 
findings of the court a quo which had ordered the deletion of the racially restrictive 
provision. The basis of his decision was that section 13 of the Trust Property Control 
Act13 authorises a court to vary or delete the provisions of a trust instrument where 
such provisions "(a) hamper the achievement of the objects of the founder; or (b) 
prejudice the interests of beneficiaries; or (c) are in conflict with the public interest". 
 
Bertelsman AJA argued that a racially exclusive trust provision is in conflict with 
public policy - which is now rooted in the Constitution and constitutional values such 
the achievement of equality, the advancement of human rights and freedoms and 
non-racialism. Further, as the Bill of Rights applies to all law, including the law 
relating to charitable trusts, the objects and provision of the trust have to conform to 
the prohibition of unfair discrimination under section 9 of the Constitution and the 
Equality Act - which in its Schedule explicitly identifies "unfairly withholding 
scholarships, bursaries, or any other form of assistance from learners of particular 
groups identified by the prohibited grounds" as amounting to unfair discrimination. 
Accordingly, Bertelsman AJA found that the ruling in the court a quo which deleted 
the words "European", "British" and "Dutch South African" was fully empowered by 
statute and was in line with the Constitution, and thus dismissed the appeal against 
it. 
 
                                                 
12  BoE Trust Limited 2013 3 SA 236 (SCA) para 16. 
13  Section 13 of the Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988. 
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It was in view of this reasoning in Emma Smith that the appellants in the present 
case believed that their appeal against Mitchell AJ's judgment "must succeed".14 
Erasmus AJA, however, felt differently. For him, it should be "immediately clear that 
the facts dealt with in Emma Smith are distinguishable from the facts of the instant 
case".15 Three reasons are provided in support of this view. First, the trust in the 
Emma Smith case provided for the "single purpose that the funds put in trust shall 
be dedicated in perpetuity for the promotion and encouragement of education". 
Secondly, the testator in Emma Smith did not state any alternatives should the terms 
become impossible to carry out. And thirdly, the trust provisions had already been 
carried out for decades prior to being challenged in the "new" constitutional 
dispensation.16 As he writes further:17 
 
In the instant case no bursaries were ever paid; they could not be, because 
of the universities' stance. The giving of the bursaries as Mrs De Villiers had 
intended had become impossible as a result of the universities' stance. Must 
the alternative provided in the will be given effect to? Does Mrs De Villiers' 
right to dispose of her assets as she saw fit, whether we agree with her 
exercise of that right or not, require a court to see at least whether there is 
a way in which to interpret her will so as that it does not offend public 
policy?  
 
Erasmus AJA specifically points out that the two rights that are pertinent in this case 
are the rights to property and the right to dignity. In his view, the right to property, 
as enshrined in section 25(1) of the Constitution, which provides that no one may be 
arbitrarily deprived of property, also protects a person's right to dispose of their 
assets as they wish upon their death.18 Dignity further comes into play because the 
failure to recognise freedom of testation would, in the judge's words, "also fly in the 
face of the founding constitutional principle of human dignity. The right to dignity 
allows the living, and the dying, the peace of mind of knowing that their last wishes 
would be respected after they have passed away".19  
 
                                                 
14  BoE Trust Limited 2013 3 SA 236 (SCA) para 16.  
15  BoE Trust Limited 2013 3 SA 236 (SCA) para 24. 
16  BoE Trust Limited 2013 3 SA 236 (SCA) para 24. 
17  BoE Trust Limited 2013 3 SA 236 (SCA) para 25 
18  BoE Trust Limited 2013 3 SA 236 (SCA) para 26.  
19  BoE Trust Limited 2013 3 SA 236 (SCA) para 27. 
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Erasmus AJA does note that the principle of freedom of testation and the rights that 
underlie it are not absolute. However he goes on to state that the balance to be 
struck between freedom of testation and its limitations requires firstly that we 
ascertain the wishes (or intention) of the testatrix - and we must do so even before 
determining if some rule of law prevents us from giving effect to those wishes. This 
approach, we are told, is what the rights to property and dignity demand.20 Further, 
in order to understand the testatrix's wishes it is also necessary to determine what is 
meant by impossibility. The judge reasons that because the testatrix was informed 
that it may be impossible to give effect to the trust provision due to its unlawful, 
racially-discriminatory effect, the alternative she stipulated in the proviso and her 
use of the words "... should it become impossible" indicate that she did so with such 
an impossibility in mind - in other words, the impossibility that would be occasioned 
by the possible unlawfulness of the bequest. He thus rejects the argument that 
impossibility means "objective impossibility", such as for example where no South 
African university offered an MSc in organic chemistry.21 To quote him:22 
 
As I have said, the primary function of a court, in interpreting a will, is to 
ascertain the intention of the testator. To my mind, it is clear that the 
testatrix intended that, quite simply, should it prove impossible, for whatever 
reason, to give effect to the provisions of the educational bequest, that the 
money should go to the charitable organisations. The testatrix clearly set out 
a general scheme in which she provided for foreseen eventualities. 
 
Thus the judge concludes that the refusal of the universities to participate in the 
bursary scheme constitutes impossibility. As a result, he orders that effect must be 
given to the testatrix's wishes and that the bequest be made to the charitable 
organisations she listed, and accordingly dismissed the appeal. 
 
                                                 
20  BoE Trust Limited 2013 3 SA 236 (SCA) para 29. 
21  BoE Trust Limited 2013 3 SA 236 (SCA) para 30. 
22  BoE Trust Limited 2013 3 SA 236 (SCA) para 31. 
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3 Comment: two streams of critique on the politics of law and race 
 
A critique does not consist in saying that things aren't good the way they are. It 
consists in seeing on what type assumptions, of familiar notions, of established, 
unexamined ways of thinking, accepted practices are based.23 
 
3.1 Legally speaking 
 
Erasmus AJA's decision is legally flawed because it fails to engage with the basic 
legal texts governing this issue. This failure is enabled by the judge's attempt to 
distinguish the present case at hand from the Emma Smith case, his deployment of 
the rights to property and dignity, his understanding of the meaning of impossibility 
and the over-emphasis on the intention of the testator. In so doing, the judgment 
completely misconstrues the relevant principles of the law of succession. It is of 
course trite that South African law places a high premium on the common law 
principle of freedom of testation.24 But it is equally trite that the freedom of testation 
has a number of common law limitations. A testamentary provision will not be given 
effect to if it is (1) unlawful; or (2) contrary to public policy (contra bonos mores); or 
(3) impracticably vague or (4) impossible.25 Freedom of testation can also be limited 
by statute and in this specific case, by the provisions of the Trust Property Control 
Act, which authorises a court to delete or vary a trust provision or even to terminate 
the trust altogether.26  
 
The judge chose to focus on the ground of impossibility rather than unlawfulness. 
His view was that it was not necessary to consider the aspect of unlawfulness given 
that the testatrix had specifically foreseen impossibility and made alternative 
arrangements in the light of it. But this view can be accepted only if one accepts 
that a testatrix can, in her will, dictate to the court the terms of its interpretation or 
that she can foresee and resolve all future interpretive problems generated by the 
                                                 
23  Foucault "So is it Important to Think?" 456. 
24  De Waal and Schoeman-Malan Law of Succession 4. 
25  De Waal and Schoeman-Malan Law of Succession 4; Jamneck "Freedom of Testation" 115-118. 
26  De Waal and Schoeman-Malan Law of Succession 4; Jamneck "Freedom of Testation" 117. 
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will. Admittedly, the addition of an alternative beneficiary made the judge's attempt 
at escaping the principles set out in Emma Smith and Syfrets and the provisions of 
the Trust Property Control Act, the Equality Act and the Constitution much easier. 
But as the proper basis for deciding this case should have been unlawfulness rather 
than impossibility, such an alternative is basically irrelevant because the conditions 
that trigger its coming into effect (i.e. the impossibility of the primary bequest of a 
bursary trust fund for white students) were not in place. It was still possible to 
distribute the bursaries and thereby enforce the bequest, albeit in a manner that is 
constitutionally cogent. 
 
The primary intention of the testatrix was to establish a trust that would provide 
bursaries for "white South African students" from the selected universities who 
planned to complete doctoral studies in a European or British university. That this 
was the primary intention is evidenced by the fact that the testatrix named and 
established the trust in memory of her husband who was a "leading" applied chemist 
with doctorates in chemistry from the Universities of Oxford and Pretoria.27 Thus the 
court must focus on and exhaust this primary intention before even considering the 
ground of impossibility. When the universities refused to participate in the bursaries 
they did so because they believed the racially-restrictive trust provision was 
unlawful. Their refusal cannot be said to render the provision impossible; it remains 
only unlawful. In other words, the reason or legal impediment for why the provision 
cannot be given effect to is not because there are not any white students in a 
university, or because no university in South Africa offers the MSc degree. Rather, it 
was because the provision is racially discriminatory against Blacks and therefore 
unlawful and contrary to public policy. It is in this sense that the case is not at all 
distinguishable from the Emma Smith case. 
 
As was also confirmed in Emma Smith, public policy is now rooted in the 
Constitution.28 Section 9(4) of the Constitution provides that no person may unfairly 
discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on the grounds inter alia of race. 
                                                 
27  BoE Trust Limited 2013 3 SA 236 (SCA) para 6. 
28  See also Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC). 
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Because race is a ground explicitly listed in section 9(3), section 9(5) provides that 
discrimination on the basis of race is to be presumed to be unfair, unless it is shown 
to be fair.29 Further, if one accepts that the Constitution is "historically self-
conscious", as Klare suggests, I contend that the unfairness of the racially exclusive 
trust provision is considerably aggravated by the fact that it was designed with the 
aim of protecting and advancing persons who were and still are vastly advantaged 
by past and present forms of unfair discrimination, racial exclusion and white 
privilege.30 Furthermore, section 6 read with section 7 of the Equality Act, which 
gives effect to section 9(4) of the Constitution, prohibits the State or any person 
from unfairly discriminating against any person on the ground inter alia of race. In 
terms of section 7(c) of the Act, unfair racial discrimination would include "the 
exclusion of persons of a particular race group under any rule or practice that 
appears to be legitimate but which is actually aimed at maintaining exclusive control 
by a particular race group" and in terms of section 7(e) of the same Act it would also 
include "the denial of access to opportunities." Clearly a bursary scheme providing 
postgraduate doctoral funding may appear to be legitimate in addressing the brain-
drain, as the high court judge intimated, but its restriction to white students reveals 
that its aim is to deny black MSc graduates the opportunity of access to the bursary. 
On these grounds alone the judge could have relied on section 13 of the Trust 
Property Control Act to vary the terms of the trust provision by deleting the words 
"white". This so because, in the light of the earlier distinction between impossible 
and unlawful, the testatrix's inclusion of an alternative beneficiary in the case of 
"impossibility" cannot be said to be her foreseeing that the clause would be in 
conflict with public interest. 
However, I think there is a stronger and more compelling argument available if one 
accepts the view that this decision is not simply one legal view or interpretation of a 
will but is also a normative argument about the influence of the Constitution on the 
common law of succession, and the "private" law more generally. Erasmus AJA 
justifies his decision for the most part by simply remaining within the bounds of the 
common law. He refers to the Constitution only to point out that freedom of 
                                                 
29  Harksen v Lane 1998 1 SA 300 (CC). 
30  Klare 1998 SAJHR 146. 
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testation is part and parcel of the right to property. Unlike Emma Smith and Syfrets, 
he never confronts the question of how the Constitution alters the fundamental legal 
concepts of the law of succession, especially freedom of testation. Drucilla Cornell 
and Nick Friedman have made a powerful argument that "the Constitution mandates 
that the common law be deeply infused with constitutional values".31 They argue 
further that this mandate to develop the common law involves doing so not just on 
the basis of the Bill of Rights but also in view of the promotion of the values of the 
Constitution as a whole.32 I refer to them here because their argument functions as 
an implicit critique of Erasmus AJA's evasion of the clear constitutional questions 
raised by and in this case - specifically on the now "constitutional" nature of all legal 
interpretation and the horizontal application of the Bill of Rights.  
 
The textual basis for Cornell and Friedman's argument is section 39(2) of the 
Constitution, which states that when interpreting legislation and developing the 
common law, courts must promote the spirit, purport and object of the Bill of Rights. 
They argue that section 39(2) imposes a "non-conditional obligation on courts to 
develop the common law in line with the Constitution in each and every case".33 
They arrive at this conclusion through a holistic and cumulative reading of section 
39(2) together with section 173 (which grants courts the inherent power to develop 
the common law) and section 8(1) of the Constitution (which expressly states that 
"[t]he Bill of Rights applies to all law, and binds the legislature, the executive, the 
judiciary and all organs of state"). Through this reading, they explain that the 
judiciary (that is, not just the judges of the Constitutional Court but also of the SCA 
and the High Court) must always promote the Bill of Rights in their adjudication of 
legal matters in order to further the Constitution's vision for a transformed legal 
order.34  
 
The express inclusion of the judiciary in section 8(1) of the 1996 Constitution was 
done with the intention to avoid diminishing the effects that the Bill of Rights was to 
                                                 
31  Cornell and Friedman 2011 Malawi LJ 3. 
32  Cornell and Friedman 2011 Malawi LJ 4. 
33  Cornell and Friedman 2011 Malawi LJ 15, own emphasis. 
34  Cornell and Friedman 2011 Malawi LJ 17. 
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have on the rules of the private law. Such inclusion was meant to unambiguously 
indicate that the Constitution intends to inform and transform the relations between 
individuals, so that, in Cornell and Friedman's words, apartheid would not live on in 
the "private sphere".35 Recall Madala J's famous phrase in Du Plessis v De Klerk:36 
Ours is a multi-racial, multi-cultural, multi-lingual society in which the ravages of 
apartheid disadvantage and inequality are just immeasurable. The extent of the 
oppressive measures in South Africa was not confined to government/individual 
relations, but equally to individual/individual relations. In its effort to create a new 
order, our Constitution must have been intended to address these oppressive 
undemocratic practices at all levels. In my view our Constitution starts at the lowest 
level and attempts to reach the furthest in its endeavours to restructure the 
dynamics in a previously racist society. 
 
To return to BoE Trust Limited, we can now see that it is not simply that the Trust 
Property Control Act provided the judge with ample space to vary the terms of the 
trust provisions in order to cure its conflict with public policy (and specifically its 
contravention of the Constitution and the Equality Act). On Cornell and Friedman's 
argument, the judge was under "a non-conditional obligation" to interpret the 
common law of succession in a way that would have given expression to the equality 
clause (and specifically the injunction against unfair discrimination based on race) 
and to the ideal of "non-racialism" embedded in the Constitution. Clearly, an 
interpretive emphasis on freedom (of testation), property and dignity that functions 
to ultimately justify and shield from scrutiny racially discriminatory actions by 
individuals such as the creation of bursary schemes that exclude and disadvantage 
blacks is not reconcilable with the Constitution's "objective, normative value 
system".37 Because the trust established in this case would have involved acceptance 
by public institutions (universities) and thus could not, by definition, be purely 
private, the judge had an affirmative constitutional obligation and a political 
                                                 
35  Cornell and Friedman 2011 Malawi LJ 17. 
36  Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 3 SA 850 (CC) para 163 
37  Cornell and Friedman 2011 Malawi LJ 18. 
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responsibility, due to the well-established and frequently proclaimed public policy 
against racial discrimination, to invalidate and alter the provisions of the trust.38  
 
In my view, the problems with this judgment which I have just pointed out can be 
traced to the judge's reliance on a traditional legal or formalist approach - an 
approach which has been challenged for its denial of the politics of interpretation 
brought about by the legal and political transformation of South Africa, and also for 
its consistent failure to meet the challenge of transformative constitutionalism.39 
That Erasmus AJA was in this case relying on a traditional or formalist approach to 
law can be discerned in his insistence on establishing the plain or ordinary legal 
meaning of the words contained in the will to ascertain the wishes of the testator, 
and his rhetorical construction of a strict divide between the law (i.e. giving effect to 
the testatrix's intention and thus protecting her testamentary freedom and her rights 
to dignity and property) and politics/morality (the racially exclusive manner in which 
she exercised her rights and freedom). As the judge tells us, the principle of freedom 
of testation and the right to bequeath one's property must be given effect to 
irrespective of whether "...we agree with her exercise of that right or not...".40 This 
denial of politics and morality (and what is more politically and morally controversial 
than race and racism?) evinces another formalist ploy, namely the pretence of legal 
stability, neutrality and objectivity. 
 
From his emphasis on the "intention of the testatrix", it would appear that the judge 
seems to believe, incorrectly to my mind, that words are fixed and stable and can 
self-generate the correct legal solution without calling upon a normative viewpoint, 
that in other words, the testatrix's intention can be discovered by means of logical 
deduction to the exclusion of normative reasoning. In so doing, the judge fails to 
acknowledge that the flipside of the coin of constraint by legal materials is the 
interpretive freedom to give them meaning.41 For as Cornell and Friedman and many 
others demonstrate, the "application" of law is also always already an 
                                                 
38  Voyer 1999 Wm & Mary Bill Rts J 943. 
39  Van Marle 2003 TSAR 549. 
40  BoE Trust Limited 2013 3 SA 236 (SCA) para 25. 
41  Botha 2004 SAJHR 249-283. 
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"interpretation" of law, and interpretation is always normative.42 This belief in the 
clarity and certainly of legal meaning as well as the choice of a judicial style devoid 
of politics and normative consideration is what exposes the judgment as being 
constituted and framed by a jurisprudential approach that Du Plessis, in the context 
of statutory interpretation, names "interpretive formalism".43 Du Plessis describes 
interpretive formalism as a "purely textual" approach, that is, an approach that is 
pre-occupied with the fixed attributes of a legal text that renders it controllable by 
limiting its meaning.44 This approach could also be seen as narrow and "literalist", 
and as displaying a "strong faith in the precision, determinacy and self-revealingness 
of words and texts".45 Erasmus AJA's judgment in BoE is formalistic in this sense 
because whether one is speaking of the intention of the legislature or of a testatrix, 
there is a desire to abide by the "very linguistic form" or plain meaning of the text, 
even when the extant legal rules permit and mandate deviation from, and alteration 
of, that meaning.46 This then explains why the judge appears to believe that it is 
only through discerning the "intention" of the testatrix that a "purely legal" (and 
presumably also correct) outcome can be achieved. 
 
In my view, it is the judge's reliance on this formalist approach that facilitated his 
denial of the dilemma of interpretation (that is, the fact that law is indeterminate, 
and that it is by that indeterminacy that it invites value-based forms of legal 
interpretation) and abetted his escape from the constitutional and political 
implications of this case. The "jurisprudential escapism" evidenced in Erasmus AJA's 
judgment is aptly described by Klare as follows:47 
 
The goal is to maintain the law/politics boundary by describing rational 
decision-procedures (deduction, balancing, purposive reasoning etc) with 
which to arrive at determinate legal outcomes from neutral, consensus-
based general principles expressed or immanent within a legal order. 
 
                                                 
42  Cornell and Friedman 2011 Malawi LJ 6-7. 
43  Du Plessis Re-interpretation of Statutes 100-101. 
44  Du Plessis Re-interpretation of Statutes 100-101.  
45  Klare 1998 SAJHR 168. 
46  Du Plessis Re-interpretation of Statutes 100-101. 
47  Klare 1998 SAJHR 158. 
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However, not only does the judge attempt to escape the dilemma of interpretation 
by treating freedom of testation as unproblematic and self-evident, but he also 
ignores another novel and transformative element of "post"-apartheid 
constitutionalism, namely the horizontal application of the Bill of Rights, which 
subjects private conduct and private relations to the normative influence and legal 
force of the Constitution.48 
 
For this argument, let us also turn to Van der Walt's postmodern post-apartheid 
theory of law, and particularly his understanding of horizontality. In Van der Walt's 
view, the horizontal application of the Bill of Rights dissolves the distinction between 
the private and the public, and between private law (law of succession) and public 
law (constitutional rights and values).49 Because there is no sphere of human activity 
or social practice that is not in some way or other governed by a legal rule, and 
there is no legal rule that is immune from the Constitution, Van Der Walt contends 
that all (statutory and common law) private law rules that govern such activity or 
practice are open to amendment, rethinking and influence from the Constitution.50 
This means that the fairly "absolutist" conception of freedom of testation that the 
judge relies on will have to be squared off against a wide array of constitutional 
rights, values and ideals such as, among others, non-racialism, ubuntu, substantive 
equality, transformation, social justice and constitutional supremacy. 
 
For Van der Walt, horizontality also works to constantly resist "privatising 
interpretations" of rights, interpretations that instrumentalise fundamental rights (in 
this case, rights such as those to dignity and property) to promote private 
interests.51 This is important here because of Van der Walt's argument that another 
function of constitutional horizontality is to restrain private legal subjects from using 
their economic power (of which private property rights are an obvious example) to 
violate human rights and to deviate from constitutional duties and norms. Tellingly, 
                                                 
48  For our purposes, see s 8(2) of the Constitution read together with s 9(4). Klare 1998 SAJHR 155 
describes horizontal application as one of the "postliberal" features of the Constitution.  
49  Van der Walt Law and Sacrifice 110. 
50  Van der Walt 1997 SA Public Law 11; Van der Walt 2001 SAJHR 341. 
51  Van der Walt Law and Sacrifice 111. 
JM MODIRI   PER / PELJ 2013(16)5 
 
597 / 614 
 
Van Der Walt specifically cites Unger,52 who has invoked democracy in an argument 
against the granting of "property claims beyond death as embodied in the law of 
succession".53 Unger specifically notes the role of inheritance in entrenching 
intergenerational class hierarchies and privileges, which in South Africa are 
thoroughly racialised. 
 
Van der Walt thus interprets the horizontal application of the Bill of Rights in terms 
of a resistance against "neo-colonialism" and its attendant "privatisation of the 
political".54 In a similar vein, Van Marle has warned that the relentlessly privatist 
logic of post-apartheid law (a logic which in her estimation also pervades South 
African life more generally) "hinders transformation, reparation and socio-economic 
restructuring, makes new interactions and ways of living impossible, and prevents 
the coming into being of a public sphere characterised by dialogue, resistance, 
eternal questioning and the imagining of new identities".55  
 
The concern about the judgment's jurisprudential escapism, and its avoidance of 
engaging with the horizontality of the Constitution has yet one last dimension: its 
implications for post-apartheid jurisprudence and transformation. If horizontality can 
be thought of in terms of what Van Marle, following Deleuze and Guattari, calls a 
"post-apartheid becoming", the becoming of subjects/individuals, their becoming 
minor by the giving up of majoritarian standards, privileges and certitudes, then to 
what extent does this judgment stand in the way of that becoming?56 If, also, we 
can think of this horizontality in terms of Cornell's definition of transformation, which 
denotes change radical enough not only to alter the identity of a system but also of 
its subjects - to enable their openness to new worlds and futures, then to what 
extent is this judgment a conservative and regressive one?57 In his attempt to 
retrieve and safeguard an "intention" irretrievably corrupted (or haunted?) by racial 
discrimination, and in his refusal to pronounce on its constitutional validity, the judge 
                                                 
52  Unger Legal Analysis 14; Unger Democracy Realized 144 
53  Van der Walt Law and Sacrifice 82. 
54  Van der Walt Law and Sacrifice 55-77; 65. 
55  Van Marle 2005 SA Public Law 251.  
56  Van Marle 2010 CCR 350. 
57  Cornell Transformations 1. 
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negates both this becoming and this transformation - failing to resist the 
privatisation of the political and thus unwittingly allowing "apartheid" to live on 
unmitigated in the private sphere.58  
 
3.2 The race question 
 
Whiteness is unseen, and this invisibility is how whiteness gets reproduced as the 
unmarked mark of the human.59 
 
If, as I have argued, this judgment is better cast as a normative argument about the 
influence of the Constitution and human rights on the private law, then it can also be 
read as a political and ideological statement about the "proper" relationship between 
race and law. In making this claim, I am adapting a method of critique that Matsuda 
calls "asking the other question".60 In other words, having identified interpretive 
formalism and horizontal anxiety to be at work in the judgment, the other question 
to be posed should be: where is the racial ideology in this? Where is the racial 
politics or racism in this? This way we are better able to understand the 
interconnectedness of law and race, and the convergences between a specific 
approach to law and a specific view of race.  
 
In order to apprehend the racial ideology that underlies this judgment, we should 
begin by noting Mbembe's argument that the "the defeat of legalised white 
supremacy" (i.e. apartheid) in South Africa has not ended the struggle for racial 
equality not only due to the persistence of racial inequalities but also because of the 
continuation of white racist prejudice in the private sphere.61 For Mbembe, this 
migration of racism and racial power into the realm of the private is central to the 
re-invention and operation of white supremacy and racial privilege in an age of 
formal legal equality.62 It follows then that in order to challenge whites' position in 
the social hierarchy, and in order to transform law's relation to racism from one of 
                                                 
58  Cornell and Friedman 2011 Malawi LJ 17. 
59  Ahmed 2004 www.borderlands.net.au. 
60  Matsuda 1991 Stan L Rev 1189. 
61  Mbembe 2008 Public Culture 6. 
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promotion and production to one of eradication and objection, the private sphere 
would need to be demythologised, and racism openly challenged in all spheres. 
 
Yet in the judgment itself, race or racism are never mentioned. The possibility that 
we might be dealing with a case of private racial discrimination (specifically white 
racism) is not considered at all. In fact, at one point, Erasmus AJA refers - with 
seeming approval - to an argument made my Mitchell AJ in the High Court that the 
racist clause in the will could be rendered "fair" if one were to take account of the 
fact that it contained a condition stipulating that the beneficiaries of the bursaries 
should, upon completion of their doctoral studies, return to South Africa, thus 
alleviating the problem of white skills emigration commonly called the "brain 
drain".63 In the judgment, the deeply racial character of this case was "neutralised" 
by its technical legalist and formalist approach and the significance of race or racism 
as central issues is left completely unmentioned. It is this "blindness" to race and 
this refusal to grant race any significant attention that reveals Erasmus AJA's 
judgment to be based on the racial ideologies of colour-blindness and post-racialism. 
Critical race legal analysis is useful here in amplifying the volume of the judgment's 
silence on race in order to uncover its hidden racial view.64  
 
Bonilla-Silva has argued, in the context of the United States but in a manner 
applicable to South Africa, that colour-blindness should be seen as part of an 
ideology that emerges in an era after the abolition of formal systems of racial 
segregation and discrimination to defend the contemporary racial order - an ideology 
he calls "colour-blind racism".65 He argues that colour-blind racism operates by 
means of four discursive or rhetorical frames that are mobilised to justify racism and 
racial inequality and in this way is central to the "reproduction and enforcement of 
the status quo".66 In his view, these frames are also ideological: they mask and 
conceal the operation of racial power and domination, filter and explain racial 
phenomena in predictable and non-racial ways, and distort the social reality of race. 
                                                 
63  BoE Trust Limited 2013 3 SA 236 (SCA) para 14. 
64  See Crenshaw Critical Race Theor; Delgado and Stefancic Critical Race Theory: Introduction. 
65  Bonilla-Silva Racism Without Racists 25. 
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Following Bonilla-Silva, I argue that this judgment reflects three of the four frames 
of "colour-blind racism" that he identifies, namely abstract liberalism, naturalisation 
and the minimisation of racism. These are briefly discussed in turn: 
 
(a) Abstract liberalism. Abstract liberalism, in the judgment, involves using ideas 
associated with political and economic liberalism (rule of law, private property 
rights, individual autonomy (implied in the right to dignity)) in an abstract 
manner when approaching race-related problems. By not connecting these 
liberal principles to the concrete context of racial inequality, the persistence of 
white privilege and black youths' lack of access to tertiary education, the 
judgment's treatment of freedom of testation functions to obscure how 
practices of racial exclusion are not simply a matter of individual choice but 
are also of a historical, political and structural nature. Liberal legalism, in its 
abstract form, provides the judgment with an appearance of neutrality and 
reasonableness, even as it works to defend an obviously racist testamentary 
provision.67  
 
(b) Naturalisation. Naturalisation is a frame that explains overtly racial 
phenomena by suggesting they are natural and immutable. In this case, an 
openly racially exclusionary clause in a will is treated from the beginning to 
the end of the judgment as a normal, routine testamentary clause and its 
legal problematics are reduced to just another question of discerning 
testamentary intention. Thus racism is naturalised, treated as mostly a set of 
personal choices and decisions that are rational, universal and expected 
rather than as a product of social and cultural contingencies.68  
 
(c) Minimisation. Minimisation of racism is a frame that is premised on the 
assertion that racial discrimination is no longer a central factor affecting the 
lives of Blacks, and that race and racism are no longer legitimate candidates 
for legal attention and public concern. The complete avoidance of the racially 
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discriminatory nature of the testamentary provision appears to issue from the 
sentiment that race is merely an afterthought or back-story in the case, 
despite its obvious centrality in the legal history of the dispute. When racism 
is minimised in this way, it becomes easy for the judge to insinuate that the 
only (or the most significant) legal problem with the testamentary bequest at 
issue in this case is the "impossibility" of its execution occasioned by the 
objection of the universities.69 
 
The replication of these three frames of colour-blind racism in the judgment can be 
explained with reference to the judge's reliance on what Olson refers to as a "pre-
political idea of race", an idea of race that treats it as something constructed prior 
to, or outside the political realm, as a prediscursive reality.70 This pre-politicisation of 
race negates the fact that race and racism function primarily to maintain the social, 
economic and cultural power of one race, the dominant race (whites) at the expense 
of and through the oppression and exclusion of another, the marginalised race 
(Blacks). Olson notes three specific consequences of the pre-politicisation of race.71 
First, race is relegated to the realm of the private. Through this relegation, an 
obviously racist clause in a will is treated solely as a personal choice ("intention") 
and objections to it are rendered as merely competing or even intrusive opinions. 
Secondly, it redefines racial domination from white supremacy to abstract 
discrimination thereby detracting from the specific and concrete modalities by which 
anti-black racism and white supremacist thought and practice operate in society. And 
thirdly, it also relocates whites from a privileged identity and dominant social group 
to a politically neutral category, to just a race or culture among other racial and 
cultural groups. The result here is that unjustly earned white privileges together with 
property relations structured by the past and present of apartheid are normalised 
and protected under the pretext of constitutional rights to dignity, property and 
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freedom.72 Ultimately, reliance on a pre-political concept of race results in the 
normalisation of whiteness and its position of structural power.73  
 
Taken together, the central effect of the deployment of these three frames of 
colour-blind racism undergirded by a pre-political idea of race is to aid in law's 
relentless depoliticisation of contentious racial issues. Wendy Brown defines 
depoliticisation as involving the removal of a "political phenomenon from 
comprehension of its historical emergence and from recognition of the powers that 
produce and contour it".74 In this case, depoliticisation is achieved by eschewing the 
question of white racial power and the history of apartheid, dispossession and racial 
inequality in the representation of the legal dispute at hand. In the judge's elision of 
power and history, private and personal vocabularies come to stand in for and 
replace public and political ones (the language of individual choice, private 
ownership and respect for the last wishes of the dead and their peace of mind in 
knowing that those wishes will be respected after they pass away replaces an 
enquiry into the public implications of universities carrying out racist testamentary 
clauses, the law's explicit endorsement of the continuation and transfer of white 
privileges, and the unquestioned naturalness of liberal and capitalist principles).75 As 
I noted earlier,with reference to Van der Walt and Van Marle, depoliticisation in this 
judgment takes the form of privatisation - and here we can hear echoes of Williams' 
concern that the rhetoric of privatisation in response to racial issues functions as a 
"rationalising agent" for public unaccountability and irresponsibility, but I would add 
also for justifying racially discriminatory acts and downplaying racism.76  
 
Bonilla-Silva's provocative term "colour-blind racism" is telling for its exposure of 
colour-blindness as itself a racial ideology in contrast to its traditional pretension of 
racial perspectivelessness.77 Through this term, colour-blindness can be seen as not 
simply an inability or refusal to see race but as itself another, albeit different, way of 
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seeing race and for explaining, indeed explaining away, racism. Colour-blindness is 
also non-performative in Sara Ahmed's sense: it does not do what it says and cannot 
bring about the effects that it names.78 As Neil Gotanda reminds us, the very logic of 
colour-blindness is circular and self-contradictory for in order to be consciously blind 
to something (especially something as ubiquitous as raciality) one must see it first, 
and then suppress acknowledgement of what has been seen. To be racially colour-
blind is to "ignore what one has already noticed"; it is to perceive race and then to 
ignore it.79 But, as Gotanda also points out, colour-blindness is also normatively 
contradictory because it perpetuates that which it disavows as even existing. In its 
systemic denial of racial subordination, it allows such subordination to continue.80  
 
This understanding of colour-blindness as racial, and ideological, anticipates a 
further understanding - one that exposes the inherent, yet latent, whiteness and 
thus racism of colour-blindness.81 On this view, colour-blindness moves from being 
seen as an innocent or misguided idealism or a well-meaning but premature 
approach to race to being figured as itself a new development within, or even logical 
modern progression of, white racism; as not only helping to obscure and sustain 
racism but a form of racism in its own right. Thus when colour-blindness is seen to 
so frequently leave racism unchallenged, the relation between anti-Black racism and 
colourblindness (as an extension of liberal racial ideology) should be rethought - and 
explained not as accidental but as co-constitutive.82 How else does one explain the 
judge's refusal to sever the racially exclusive, whites-only clause to include eligible 
students from all racial groups, especially in the light of the fact that the trustees 
and the universities not only did not object to the alteration but were in fact the 
ones who called for it in the first place?  
 
On my reading, the judgment can be seen as a defence of private racism and a 
refusal to see or even challenge white privilege. In this context, the rights to 
property and dignity that are said to be the basis of freedom of succession 
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metamorphose into a right to be racist, a right to have one's racist intentions treated 
with legal respect. I am, in other words reading this judgment as an instance of 
what Williams warned of as the moment where laws would "[become] described and 
enforced in the spirit of our prejudices".83 This is because the conclusions reached in 
this judgment make sense only when coupled with the conservative appropriation of 
the discourse of liberal constitutional rights and with the adoption of a tolerant 
posture towards racism. The judge's obsession with maintaining a certain legal 
fidelity to the intention of the testatrix (despites its discriminatory and hence 
unconstitutional nature) unwittingly enlists law to a purpose which, at best, judicially 
legitimises an official stance of denial and evasion with regards to racism and at 
worst, effectively sides with a "racist point of view"84 or more simply, what Essed 
calls "a white point of view".85  
 
4 Conclusion 
 
When Klare made the still prescient observation that the South African legal culture 
is characterised by interpretive and jurisprudential conservatism,86 he clarified that 
by "conservative" he was referring to "cautious" traditions of legal analysis and not 
to political ideology.87 He further explains that by caution he means to denote "a 
reluctance to press legal materials toward the limits of their pliability" and "an 
exaggerated concern to give the appearance of conforming to traditional canons of 
interpretive fidelity".88 The judgment of Erasmus AJA exemplifies precisely this 
conservative or cautious approach. His decision is anchored by an individualistic and 
absolute notion of freedom of testation which exhibits a reluctance to press the 
extant legal materials in order to produce a constitutionally cogent and substantive 
legal solution. It also evinces an exaggerated concern with being true to the "golden 
rule" (which is actually just another theory) of the interpretation of wills, which is to 
give effect to the "intention" of the testatrix. Klare's fear was that when conservative 
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or cautious approaches to adjudication, such as the one present in BoE, are 
adopted, the project of constitutional transformation is likely to suffer as a result.89  
 
My concerns with Erasmus AJA's decision also pertain to its refusal to adopt a race-
conscious method of analysis in approaching this dispute and its choice to follow a 
typically colour-blind and post-racial perspective, one that reduces the significance of 
race and also distorts the social realities it produces. However, the absence of racial 
analysis or race-consciousness in the judgment is itself political and ideological. 
Failure to incorporate racial analysis in a legal dispute where race is obviously 
significant is to say that race does not matter (at least, does not matter in law), and 
is therefore also to be complicit with continuing forms of racial exclusion and 
marginalisation which are permitted, facilitated and tolerated by law and legal 
discourse. This double-denial of race, which is the simultaneous denial of law's own 
investment in racial power and subordination and of the relevance of race to legal 
inquiry, discourse and adjudication, renders law impotent and incapable of 
addressing racism. More significantly, such a denial functions to eviscerate race from 
our field of perception and meaning, so that we are eventually no longer able to 
"see" and "name" racism as racism. This is why I have argued that the judgment's 
lack of a decisive rejection of racism is better read not simply as the outcome of a 
colour-blind and race-neutral approach but rather as a legal affirmation of racism 
and as a defence of the privileges located in the white private sphere. 
 
It is not my suggestion that all judges should be well-versed in critical legal theory 
and with philosophical and sociological writings on race - although their decisions will 
undoubtedly be enriched by them. More modestly, I am arguing that part of the task 
and responsibility of judges is to see and treat each new case before them as an 
opportunity to rethink and re-imagine the law and legal doctrine, to probe commonly 
held legal assumptions and to deepen post-apartheid South African jurisprudence in 
ways that make it more valuable/responsive to a transforming, plural and 
heterogeneous society. Instead what can be observed throughout Erasmus AJA's 
judgment is a preference for a formalist, mechanical, pre-constitutional mode of 
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reasoning in contrast to a substantive, politically and morally engaged one. In both 
its jurisprudential approach and its racial politics there is a seeming resistance to 
change that permeates the judgment, a refusal to let apartheid go and to 
contemplate the possibility of living and judging in another South Africa, a "South 
Africa in memory of apartheid".90 It is once again at this crucial intersection of the 
judgment's formalist approach and its expressly non-transformative tenor that a 
strong homology between jurisprudential approach and political perspective arises. 
That is, it is here that we can most clearly see how a traditional (formalist) legal 
method, underpinned by central tropes of capitalism and legal liberalism (private 
property and ownership; the public/private divide, individual autonomy, negative 
rights and race-neutrality) functions effectively as a legal mask for conservative 
racial politics, for encouraging the invisibility of the material operations of race in 
law, and thereby for permitting the discursive reinsertion of racism into legal 
doctrine and ideology. 
 
In conclusion, then, the problems of the lack of a jurisprudentially transformative 
and substantive mode of adjudication together with the negation of a progressive 
race-conscious orientation identified here are of course not specific to Erasmus AJA's 
BoE ruling, although they do emerge with a particular acuteness within it. Thus, this 
note has been animated by more than a desire to debunk the air of necessity and 
inevitability that gives all judicial decisions their appearance of legitimacy or to pierce 
the veil of judicial privilege that often shields judges from political criticisms and 
exposures that also reveal their hidden personal biases and predilections or even to 
humiliate the SCA and the judge for lack of jurisprudential reflection, depth and 
transparency. Rather, a broader argument is being pursued here, one aimed at 
tentatively mapping an alliance between conservative forms of jurisprudence and 
conservative political approaches to race, and highlighting the danger of such an 
alliance for critical projects of legal, social and political transformation that aim to 
continue and deepen the struggle for racial justice, equality and freedom. It should 
be emphasised, following the CRT structural determinism thesis, that the 
transformation of the racial structure of society and the eradication of racial 
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hierarchies and inequalities depends in large part on the transformation, expansion 
and political re-orientation of current legal tools and thought-structures.91 When 
formalism and legal liberalism are readily adopted to resolve racially-contoured 
disputes, we will be left only with a continuation of the status quo, with a sense of 
changelessness, and ultimately another point of failure in the project of 
transformative constitutionalism: 
 
Every ... judicial decision embodies a choice between upholding remnants of the old 
order and enforcing change brought about by the new; every decision to uphold the 
existing law implies a sacrifice of constitutional reform, even when it is indubitably 
correct or unavoidable. Even more importantly, every decision in favour of stability 
and certainty or vested and acquired rights inevitably comes at the price of 
suppressing plurality, dissent and change.92  
 
The spectres of race, and its ghostly traces on the lives and laws of South Africa, will 
never rest until we heed their haunting. 
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